This paper provides evidence on the effectiveness of one of the most common policies to improve nutrition among the poor, that is, a food subsidy. We study the case of subsidies on pulses in select Indian states and their impact on consumption and ultimately nutrition (protein intake). As a natural experiment, we use the introduction of pulses into India's Public Distribution System (PDS) where the variations in prices were brought about by the inclusion of pulses in the PDS in some states and not in others. Our difference in difference (DID) estimates show that change in the consumption of pulses because of their inclusion in the PDS, though statistically significant, was of a small order. The impact was not large enough to bring about any sizable difference in consumption of pulses or the total protein intake. The results withstand several robustness checks including randomized inference and triple differencing based on location and other consumer characteristics.
One of the most common policies to improve nutrition among the poor is a food subsidy. Yet there is substantive debate about the extent to which nutrition improves with lower food prices (Behrman, Deolalikar, and Wolfe 1988; Guo et al. 1999; Shimokawa 2010; Ecker and Qaim 2011) . The evidence on the link between food prices and nutrition is mixed (Jensen and Miller 2011) . Conventional wisdom suggests that among the poor, lower prices can address the problem of undernourishment, especially when the food supplying scarce nutrients is dear.
Some papers look at consumption effects of taxes on food. For example, Fletcher, Frisvold, and Tefft (2010) investigate the potential for soft drink taxes in the United States to combat rising levels of child and adolescent obesity, and show that a moderate reduction in soft drink consumption was completely offset by increases in consumption of other high-calorie drinks. Cawley and Frisvold (2015) use more disaggregated citylevel data to assess the impacts of a tax on sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs) and find sizable pass-through of the tax.
The existing (mixed) evidence on the impact of food price subsidies and taxes on nutrition, moreover, faces the concern that price variations are often not exogenous. Households that seek and receive a subsidy are usually poorer to begin with and have relatively lower food consumption and nutrition. Measuring an association between the food subsidy and consumption or nutrition improvements would thus likely provide biased estimates of the causal link between movements in prices and outcomes (Kaushal and Muchomba 2015) . Unobserved factors such as tastes and preferences could also lead to systematic differences between those who avail themselves of the food subsidy and those who do not. Faced with identification problems, Jensen and Miller (2011) use a randomized controlled trial to address the issue of endogeneity of price variation across households.
In this paper, we study the case of subsidies on pulses in select Indian states and their impact on consumption and ultimately nutrition (protein intake). As a natural experiment, we use the introduction of pulses into India's Public Distribution System (PDS) to identify the causal effects of food subsidy. The variations in prices that we exploit were brought about by the inclusion of pulses in the PDS in some states and not in others.
The case of consumption subsidy in pulses is quite important in India, home to the largest number of malnourished people in the world. A large percentage of the population is poor and faces nutritional challenges, including that of protein deficiency. With a high incidence of vegetarianism, pulses occupy a unique place in the Indian diet. Indians constitute about 70% of the world's population of vegetarians. 1 In the recent census, 29.8% of women and 28.2% of men aged 30 or more identified themselves as vegetarians (Baseline survey for Census 2014). In the consumption expenditure survey conducted by the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) in 2011/12, 38% of the rural population and 42% of the urban population lived in households that did not consume any non-vegetarian food (meat, fish, or eggs) in the 30 days before the survey.
Pulses contain 22% to 24% protein by weight-almost twice the amount in wheat and thrice that in rice (Gowda et al. 2013) , and complement cereals with protein, essential amino acids, vitamins, and minerals). Indeed, pulses are the most important sources of non-cereal protein in the Indian diet. In 2011/12, pulses contributed nearly 10% of the total protein consumed by an average household; 89% of households in India have pulses at least once a week. In comparison, only 35.4% of households who eat fish, chicken, or other meats at least once a week (IIP S and ORC Macro 2007) .
Between 2004/05 and 2009/10, four states introduced subsidized pulses into their public distribution system (PDS). This policy change offers a unique opportunity to assess the impact of subsidy on quantity of pulse consumed and total protein intake. Since the 4 states that added pulses to the PDS were not randomly selected, we use difference-indifferences (DID) method in this paper. The parallel trends in consumption of pulses between the treatment and control states prior to the policy change (introduction of pulses into the PDS in 4 states) lends confidence to our estimates as being causal.
Our DID estimates show that change in the consumption of pulses because of their inclusion in the PDS, though statistically significant, was of a small order. The impact was not large enough to bring about any sizable difference in the consumption of pulses or total protein intake. In response to the pulse subsidy, beneficiaries adjusted on both the intensive (consumption of the pulse itself) and extensive margins (changes in consumption of non-PDS pulses or items other than pulses).
We go a step further to trace out consumers' response to pulse subsidy using panel data from the Village Dynamics in South Asia (VDSA) of ICRISAT. The VDSA has monthly data on quantities of different items purchased by households from PDS, open market, and other sources. Among states covered by VDSA, Andhra Pradesh added pulses to the PDS, while Maharashtra did not. Having panel data on source-wise consumption of pulses from before and after the inclusion of pulses into PDS in a treatment and a control state allows us to see how households responded to the subsidy. We check if the increased consumption of cheaper pulses from the PDS was offset by reduced consumption from other sources. If that was the case, then we should not expect big changes in the intake of pulses, an effect like what Fletcher, Frisvold, and Tefft (2010) found in the case of a tax on SSBs. We find that in Andhra Pradesh, once households had access to cheaper pulses from PDS, they reduced the quantity purchased from the market and there was a very small increase in total pulse consumption after these adjustments.
Our findings show that including subsidized pulses into the PDS did not achieve the desired goal of this program to expand the consumption of pulses and mitigate protein deficiency. Pravin Dongre, Chairman of the India Pulses and Grains Association, articulated the industry's stand as follows: "We support the Government's initiative of [the] Food Security Bill. We need to look at not only food but nutrition security too. We urge the Government to include pulses in the proposed Bill" (Press Trust of India 2013) . 3 Similarly, Biraj Pattnaik, Principal Adviser to the Supreme Court Commissioners on the right to food, stated, "It's time for the PDS to diversify in a basket of foods. We are giving cereals but we should also look at distributing millets, pulses, oils, and possibly even fruits, eggs and milk to provide wholesome nutrition," (Mohan 2015).
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Robustness checks using triple differencing between vegetarian and non-vegetarian households or DID estimates separately for sub-samples of poor and non-poor households, as well as PDS users and non-users and only urban households show similar results. Introducing subsidized pulses into the PDS led to only a small increase in total pulse consumption of the beneficiary households. These findings are in line with what economic theory predicts: subsidizing inframarginal quantities of a food item will not lead to an appreciable increase in its consumption, especially if its demand is price inelastic (Southworth 1945) .
The PDS has enjoyed political and public support despite widespread evidence of corruption and poor targeting (Kaushal and Muchomba 2015) . Providing cereals in the PDS already costs nearly 2% of India's GDP (Tarozzi 2005) . Expanding the portfolio with new items would be desirable only if it brings about a significant consumption effect leading to nutrition benefits.
This study provides a counterargument that rests on the following. Only small changes in consumption might occur since consumers adjust their consumption on both the extensive and intensive margins. In pulses, the net effects on consumption are small, and hence nutrition effects might not be of the first order.
This paper contributes to an extensive body of literature on India's food subsidy programs. Kochar (2005) finds that subsidies (on wheat and rice) have only a limited impact on calorie intake. Tarozzi (2005) finds limited effects of PDS on children's weights. Wolfe (1988) , and Guo et al. (1999) show mixed effects of subsidies on nutrition.
Including pulses in the PDS can increase demand for pulses, but by releasing money it can also increase consumption of other items such as rice and wheat, high-value food, and nonfood items. Jensen and Miller (2011) show with their experimental data that an increase in income resulting from the subsidy may have a negligible or even negative effect on nutrition. Our findings, though in a different context, are somewhat similar.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the data and some motivating descriptive statistics. The following section looks at the implementation details of the pulse subsidy scheme. This is followed by a section outlining the empirical methods. In the results section, we present findings from both NSSO and VDSA data. The VDSA data helps trace out pathways leading to the impacts of pulse subsidy. Differential impacts across groups such as vegetarians and non-vegetarians, poor and non-poor, and PDS users and non-users are presented next. The final section concludes the paper and presents some policy implications.
The Pulse Subsidy Program
India's PDS is the world's largest food-based social safety net program, which distributes nearly 54 million tons of rice and wheat per year at highly subsidized prices to 807.2 million people through a vast network of more than 500,000 Fair-price shops (FPS) spread throughout the country.
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The PDS is jointly operated by the central and state governments. The Central Government is responsible for procurement, storage, transportation, and the bulk allocation of food grains to the state governments. Identification of eligible families, issuance of ration cards, distribution of subsidized goods and supervision of the functioning of FPS lie with the state governments. The central government subsidizes only rice, wheat, sugar, and kerosene oil. State governments can add other items to the basket of goods to be sold through the PDS, but they must pay for subsidizing these additional items from their own resources. Between 2004/05 and 2009/10, four state governments-Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Punjab, and Tamil Nadu-added subsidized pulses to the PDS.
6 Except Punjab, the other 3 states are known for prioritizing PDS reforms and making it more inclusive to cover all households and not just the poorest ones (Khera 2011b) .
Nine pulses are commonly consumed in India, with distinct regional preferences. Indeed, all 4 states chose to subsidize pulses that are most commonly consumed in their domain. In southern India, Andhra Pradesh subsidized arhar daal (split pigeon pea), while Tamil Nadu chose arhar daal and urad daal (split black gram) for subsidy. In the north, both Himachal Pradesh and Punjab subsidized a mix of pulses that included Chana daal (split chickpeas) Urad daal, and Moong (green gram; see table 1).
Sharp increases in the real price of pulses after 2004 encouraged these states to subsidize pulses (table 2) . Though the NSSO CES does not collect data separately for pulses purchased from PDS and open markets, we can see that even in the aggregate data, the distribution of subsidized pulses through PDS resulted in a significant reduction in the average price of pulses for the households who accessed PDS to buy food grains in the four states compared to the rest of India (table 3) . This reduction in prices is most probably not due to the general equilibrium effect of pulses in the PDS because households that do not access FPS pay as high prices for pulses as households in other states.
Supplementary online appendix table A2 shows results from a DID estimation where we compare average pulse prices paid by PDS-using and non-using households in the treated states and the rest of India before and after the introduction of pulses in the PDS. The triple difference regression shows that before policy change, households in treatment and control states purchased pulses at nearly the same price, and after the 4 states started subsidizing pulses through PDS, on average, a PDS user in those states paid INR6.5 less for pulses than the PDS using households in the rest of India. The non-PDS using households in both groups of states continue to pay almost the same prices as before. Thus, we have evidence that introducing pulses into PDS made it somewhat cheaper for households that accessed PDS and that it was not a general equilibrium effect.
Data and Summary Statistics
We use data from two sources. First is fullscale Consumption Expenditure Surveys (CES), also called thick rounds of survey, administered by the NSSO every five years. The NSSO surveys a representative sample of 100,000 to 125,000 households in each thick round. The sample is representative at both state and national levels and the sampling strategy and the interview schedule remain unchanged across different rounds for comparability. The NSSO CES collects 30-day recall data on total quantity consumed and expenditure incurred by sampled households for more than 300 goods and services, including 148 different food items.
Pulses were added to the PDS in the four states in years falling between the 61st and 66th rounds of the NSS CES. We use data from earlier rounds (50th and 55th) to test for parallel trends in dependent variables of interest (e.g., average quantity of pulse consumption, average protein intake) between treatment and control states. Supplementary online appendix table A1 summarizes characteristics of households in both treatment and control states before and after pulses were introduced into the PDS.
Following Deaton (1997) , the prices of commodities are computed by dividing the total expenditure on the item by quantity consumed. We estimate protein intake of households using conversion factors published by the NSSO.
Different rounds of NSSO CES give us a repeated cross-section data on household consumption expenditure. We supplement it with panel data on household consumption from VDSA. In India, the VDSA (earlier known as Village-level studies, or VLS) initiated data collection in 1975 (Walker and Ryan 1990) and it has been used extensively in the development economics literature (see Mazzocco and Saini 2012) . The VDSA sample is not representative of the districts or the states from where it is drawn, but it provides detailed data on household consumption patterns (e.g., quantity purchased, sources of purchase (including PDS, open markets, and home production), and prices paid) for years before and after the introduction of pulses into PDS. With source-wise data on pulse consumption from the same householdsboth before and after the introduction of pulse subsidy-VDSA allows us to investigate how households respond to the subsidy. Birthal et al. (2013) show consumption diversification in India away from cereals and pulses toward high-value items (fruits, vegetables, animal-source food, and processed items). In the case of pulses, apart from shifting preferences, persistently high prices have also contributed to the decline in consumption. Table 2 shows that real prices of pulses have been high. A price subsidy can potentially reduce the effect of high and rising prices on consumption. The high nutritive value of pulses, combined with their high prices in recent years and the fact that nearly all Indian households consume pulses on a regular basis-only 3% households reported no consumption of pulses in the last 30 days in the NSS CES-led policymakers in some states of India to subsidize pulses through the PDS.
Identification Strategy and Estimating Equations

Difference in Differences Estimate (DID)
Our objective is to identify the effect of introducing pulses in the PDS on the average consumption of pulses and protein intake. Ideally, we would like to randomly assign households' access to subsidized pulses and compare the average outcomes of the groups availing themselves of subsidized pulses and those paying market prices. This is the approach Jensen and Miller (2011) adopt to deal with a similar research question.
In the absence of a randomized trial, we must turn to quasi-experimental methods that try to mimic the randomized allocation setting under reasonable conditions. A major concern is that states including pulses in the PDS could be different and the differences may be correlated with pulse consumption. For example, states with lower pulse consumption may have been the ones that brought pulses into the PDS, or that states with better governance of the PDS selectively include pulses in the PDS.
In either case, the correlation between pulse consumption and its inclusion in the PDS could be confounded with other effects. In principle, many unobservable characteristics that may confound identification are those that vary across states but are fixed over time. A common method of controlling for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity is to use DID models (Galiani, Gertler, and Schargrodsky 2005) .
In estimating the effect of including pulses in the PDS, the potential problem of selection arises at two levels: first, from the targeted rollout of the program, and second, from self-selection of households into accessing and utilizing the PDS for pulses. This can raise potential econometric issues. If poorer, more liquidity-constrained households-with worse access to pulses to begin with-self-select into the scheme, then simple ordinary least squares estimates would likely be downward biased. In contrast, if the better-off households take advantage of the scheme first, then estimates without fixed effects might be biased upward.
The difference in timing of inclusion of pulses across states creates a near "natural experiment" setting. We exploit this mode of inclusion of pulses in the PDS to implement our DID strategy. With DID, we control for observed and unobserved time-invariant state-level characteristics that might be correlated with the decision to introduce pulses into the PDS as well as with households' pulses consumption. The change in the control group is an estimate of the true counterfactual, that is, what would have happened to the treatment group if there had been no intervention. As Galiani, Gertler, and Schargrodsky (2005) point out, another way to state this is that the change in outcomes in treatment areas controls for fixed characteristics and the change in outcomes in the control areas controls for time-varying factors common to both control and treatment areas.
Formally, the DID model can be specified as a two-way fixed-effect linear regression model as expressed in equation (1),
where C ist is the outcome variable of interest for household i in state s at time t (time corresponding to rounds of NSS data). Further, P ist is an indicator for being a household in one of the four treated states, and T ist is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for observations from the post treatment period that is all observations from NSS rounds after the introduction of subsidized pulses into PDS. Moreover, b 1 is the DID estimate of the impact of having access to subsidized pulses. Since the change in pulse consumption or protein intake could vary by household characteristics, we augment equation (1) with controls for socio-economic and demographic characteristics of households and their PDS use behavior. In addition to accounting for differential impact, adding the household controls increases the precision on our estimates of interest by reducing the residual variation to be explained, and our preferred estimates therefore are the ones that include a full set of household controls; e ist is the error term. All standard errors are clustered at the state level to control for intrastate correlations. Clustering is done at the state level because policy and program exposure both vary at the state level.
The impact of including pulses in the PDS can differ across pulse varieties due to differences in the extent of price rise or the degree of substitutability by cheaper varieties. We therefore estimate equation (1) for all pulses together and then separately for different pulses.
Note that since the NSSO CES does not reveal whether a household in a treatment state purchased subsidized pulses from the PDS, b 1 in equation (1) captures the intent to treat rather than the average treatment effect of the pulse subsidy.
Test for Parallel Trends
One key assumption of DID estimation is that the trends in outcomes without the treatment would have been the same in both the treatment and the control groups. This socalled parallel trend assumption is a necessary condition for the DID methodology to identify causal impacts. If the secular trends were the same in the pre-intervention periods, then it is likely that they would have been the same in the post-intervention period if the treated states had not introduced pulses into the PDS. The basic assumption is that only the inclusion of pulses in the PDS induced a deviation from the common trend.
We test for parallel trends by estimating two slightly modified versions of equation 1 using data from the 50th (1993-1994), 55th (1999-2000) and 61st (2004À05) rounds of NSSO CES-before the policy was implemented in any of the states. Table 4 presents the results of the parametric tests for parallel trends in average household consumption of six different types of pulses and total pulse consumption. Panel A of table 4 shows a test for parallel trends assuming a linear time trend. Here, time T ist of equation (1) In panel B of table 4, we relax the assumption of linear time trend by recoding time T ist differently. Instead of using time as continuous variable, as in panel A, we now use two separate time dummies for the 55th and the 61st rounds of NSSO CES data and interact them separately with the treatment dummy. This specification allows for kinks in the slopes of the outcome variables.
As in the DID estimate, in these two models the coefficient of the interaction term(s) is also the main variable of interest. A statistically significant coefficient of the interaction term(s) would indicate that the slope of the outcome variable with time is different for the treatment and the control groups in the pre-treatment period. For parallel trends to hold, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the pre-intervention secular trends are statistically the same for both control and treatment states. All interaction terms in table 4 are statistically not significant and close to zero for both linear (panel A) and non-linear (panel B) tests for parallel trends.
Results
Impact on Household Pulse Consumption
Panel A in table 5 presents the DID estimates of the impact of introduction of pulses into PDS on monthly household consumption of pulses based on equation (1). Column 1 shows estimates without household controls and column 2 presents results with a rich set of controls for household characteristics like the location of the household (rural or urban), their main occupation, family size, sex, age, religion, caste group, and education level of the household head, main fuels used by the household for cooking and lighting, quintiles Note: Both panels A and B report results from estimating equation (1) of land ownership, whether the household purchased rice, wheat, or sugar from the PDS in the preceding month, and if any member of the household had a meal outside. The main estimates of interest are in the first row and they suggest that introducing pulses in the PDS is associated with a small, that is, 251 gm to 296 gm, increase in average monthly consumption of pulses, which represents an 8% to 9% increase from the average baseline consumption of pulses in the treatment states in 2004/05.
State-Specific Impacts on Pulse Consumption
There are important differences in the pulse subsidy program across the four states in terms of (a) the choice of pulses, (b) quantities households are entitled to, and (c) the extent of subsidy. Therefore, one would expect heterogenous effects of pulse subsidies across the four states. We estimate heterogenous effects by estimating an equation like (1), but in this case, we use state-specific treatment dummies and statespecific interaction terms in the DID model (equation 2),
where AP, HP, and TN stand for Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, and Tamil Nadu, respectively. Panel B in table 5 presents coefficient estimates of equation (2). As in panel A of the table, first column shows estimates without household controls and the second column includes household controls. We prefer estimates with household controls. The top four rows present the coefficients of our interest. Introduction of pulses into PDS led to the largest increase in average monthly pulse consumption in HP (345gms), followed by TN (322gms), AP (266 gm), and Punjab (126gms). HP and TN provide 2 kg of subsidized pulses per household per month, while AP and Punjab provide only half of that quantity. This explains the larger effect of the program on pulse consumption in the first two states.
Our estimates show that, on average, provision of 1 kg of subsidized pulses through the PDS led to 126 gms to 266 gms increase in the monthly household consumption of pulses. Thus, the incremental effect of How did pulse purchase and the total pulse consumption of households in AP change because of pulse subsidy? With 2006 as the pretreatment period, 2008 as the post-treatment period, households in AP as treatment, and those in Maharashtra as the control group, we estimate 4 DID models to assess the impact of provision of subsidized arhar daal in FPS of AP on (a) quantity of arhar daal purchased from open market; (b) total quantity of arhar daal purchased from all sources; (c) change in quantity of other pulses and (d) total quantity of all pulses consumed by the household. Estimates from these models are presented in columns 1, 2, 3, and 4 of table 6. We control for household fixed effects in all four models.
We find that once subsidized arhar daal becomes available from PDS, households reduce purchase of this daal from the open market by 3.84 kg (column 1), resulting in a net increase in total household purchase of arhar daal by 6.22 kg (column 2). However, availability of cheaper arhar daal in FPS also leads to a reduction in the purchase of other pulses by 3.24 kg (column 3). Thus, 10 kg of cheaper arhar daal resulted in a net increase in total pulse consumption (arhar daal and other pulses) by 2.98 kg only. This translates to a 0.298 kg increase in total pulse consumption per kg of subsidized pulse-which is very close to the estimated (0.266 kg) obtained for AP from the NSSO CES data (see panel B in table 5).
Impact of Pulse Subsidy on Protein Consumption
The PDS in India subsidizes mainly rice and wheat. Pulses are rich in protein and are widely consumed by Indian households, who rely largely on plant proteins to meet their nutritional requirement. The move to include pulses in the PDS was motivated by the need to arrest the decline in pulse consumption due to their rising prices.
We measure the impact of pulse subsidy on the household consumption of pulse proteins and total intake of protein from all food items using estimating equations taking the same form as equation (1) with protein consumption as the dependent variable. Columns 1 and 2 in table 7 present results for protein intake from all food sources and pulses, respectively. Pulse subsidies led to an average increase in intake of pulse protein by 1.38 gm/ day/household (41 gm/month) and total protein consumption by 11.96 gm/day/household (358.86 gm/month). The increase in total protein intake is significantly larger than the increase in intake of pulse protein, probably because pulse subsidy works primarily as an income transfer. Cheaper pulse from PDS displaces pulses purchased from other sources resulting in only a small increase in total pulse consumption, but households spend the money saved on pulses to buy larger quantities of other food items that also have protein in them. We discuss the spillover effects of pulse subsidies on consumption of other food later in the paper.
Robustness Checks
A DID model controls for time-invariant differences between the treatment and the control group and the common time trend, but time-varying unobserved factors remain a concern, especially when there is a long gap between the pre-treatment and the posttreatment periods. It is possible that some policy changes may have occurred in one set of states, but not in the other between the two thick rounds of NSSO CES in 2004/05 and 2009/10 that may confound our results. For example, other welfare reforms in treatment states would also affect income and consumption. If these reforms were more vigorous in treatment states, we may overestimate the impact of pulse subsidies. Instead, if reforms were stronger in control states, it would cause underestimation of the impact. We try to address this concern using three different approaches.
Randomized Inference
First, we use randomized inference (RI) tests to assess whether treatment effects we estimate are observed purely by chance. Originally developed by Fisher (1935) and later developed by Rosenbaum (2002) to perform exact tests for experiments, RI is increasingly being applied to non-experimental data (Hess 2017) . Conley and Taber (2011) first proposed a method to extend RI tests to Our null hypothesis is that the pulse subsidy had no effect on pulse consumption, or b 1 ¼ 0 in equation (1). Getting the exact distribution of this test statistic requires estimating the DID coefficient for all possible random assignments of treatment, numbering 52,360 in our case. However, it is a common practice to use only a small subset of all possible random draws. Following Young (2016), we use 2,000 replications and use the "ritest" command developed by Hess (2017) The coefficient of interest is in row 1 of the results. A comparison with estimates from the full sample of urban and rural households (in column 2) shows that the pulse subsidy led to a bigger increase in pulse consumption in urban areas (345 gm vs. 251 gm per month). This suggests that our original results were not likely driven by confounding effects of other welfare reforms in the treatment states.
DID Estimate with a Shorter Time Gap between Pre-and Post-Treatment Data
Third, we use 63rd round of NSSO CES for pre-treatment data, that is, a thin round or annual series of CES conducted from July 2006 to June 2007 with a smaller sample of 63,729 households (as opposed to more than 100,000 households in thick rounds). Thin rounds also use the same interview schedule and similar sampling design as thick rounds. We estimate four DID models using 63rd round of NSSO CES for baseline or pretreatment data. Model results are presented in panel A of table 9.
Column 1 shows coefficient estimates from a model that averages values from 61st and 63rd rounds of NSSO CES for pre-treatment data and uses the 66th round of CES for posttreatment data. Column 2 presents estimates where only the 63rd round is used for pretreatment observations. Two of the four treatment states added pulses to PDS in 2007, but we do not know the exact month this change happened. Therefore, we estimate a third model (column 3) where we use data only from households surveyed in the first two sub-rounds, conducted from July to (1) (b1) is our test statistic. We obtain the distribution of the test statistic under the null hypothesis that the subsidy program has no effect on household pulse consumption and use 2,000 re-randomizations. The p-value of the test statistic is shown in bold font in column 4 of the table. We conducted RI tests using the "ritest" command in Stata developed by Hess (2017 Note: The dependent variable in all models ¼ total monthly consumption of pulses (kg/household/month). All models include the usual household controls: location (rural or urban), main occupation of the family, family size and sex, age, religion, caste group, education level of household head, whether the household purchased rice, wheat, or sugar from the PDS, household source of cooking and lighting fuel, and if any member consumed meals outside home and land quintiles. In panel A, NSSO CES data from 63rd round, conducted in 2006/07, is used in addition to the data from 61st and 66th rounds. 63rd round and 66th rounds were conducted only 2 years apart (2007/08 and 2009/10) . The reduced time gap between the pre-and the post-treatment period mitigates potential biases due to omitted time-varying factors that may affect pulse consumption. Panel B estimates the DID model only for urban households (column 1) and also shows results for the full sample (column 2) for comparison. Urban households are not entitled to welfare schemes like MGNREGS. Improvements in the functioning of these schemes between the pre-and post-treatment period is unlikely to confound estimates for urban households. Panel C estimates a model with continuous treatment. Unlike in other models (binary treatment), here it takes the rupee value of subsidy entitlement of a household in treatment states and a value of 0 for households in other states. The value of subsidy is the difference between retail price and the subsidized pulses' PDS price. We obtain retail prices of different pulses in each state from the price data collected by the Government of India's price monitoring cell that reports prices of the fair average quality of 22 essential commodities, including the pulses that time-varying factors are potentially not a major concern for our original estimates. The fourth model, with state-specific time trends, however, shows a significantly bigger impact of subsidy (475 gm) on total pulse consumption. The coefficient estimate from the fourth model is less credible because possible serial correlation across three rounds of data may lead to gross under-estimation of the standard errors around this coefficient (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004) .
Continuous Treatment
Until now, we have considered the pulse subsidy as a binary treatment. However, the value of subsidy entitlement is likely different across states because of differences in the size of the entitlements and the gaps between the open market and the subsidized prices of the selected pulses. The impact of the program may be an increasing function of the value of the subsidy entitlement. We estimate the impact per rupee of subsidy entitlement by reestimating equation (1) where p denotes all pulses that are subsidized in a state. We obtain retail prices of pulses from the price monitoring cell of the Government of India, which reports monthly retail prices of the fair average quality of 22 different food items (including pulses) from 99 market centers across the country. We take the average retail price of a pulse by averaging prices across all markets in the state for the period corresponding to the NSSO survey (July 2009 to June 2010). The subsidy entitlement varies across households depending on the state they are in and the family size (in case of HP where larger families are entitled to higher quantities of subsidized pulses). In HP and TN, households are entitled to one kg each of two or three different pulses. Hence, we estimate total pulse subsidy entitlement by summing the difference between retail and PDS price over all subsidized pulses p.
Row one in panel C of table 9 presents the results of the DID estimate with continuous treatment. On average, a pulse subsidy entitlement of one rupee leads to 8 gm/month increase in household pulse consumption. The coefficient, however, is statistically not significant, probably because of noisy measurement of retail price of pulses.
Extensions: Heterogenous Impacts of Pulse Subsidy
Poor Households
Panel A in table 10 shows the impact of pulse subsidy on protein intake of the poorest households who are less likely to afford other protein-rich food items. The impact on total protein intake from all food sources is shown in the first column, while the impact on intake of pulse protein is in the second column. We classify households owning 2 or fewer of the following 10 assets as poor: sewing machine, electric fan, bicycle, motorbike, car, radio, television, fridge, air conditioner and own land. Pulse subsidy has a bigger impact on intake of pulse proteins (1.485 gm vs. 1.383 gm/ day) and total protein consumption (20.574 gm vs. 11.962 gm/day) of the poor households compared to the full sample. We see larger effects for the poorer households, probably because of their higher price and income elasticities of demand.
Vegetarian Households
In the NSSO CES of 2011/12, more than 38% of households in rural India and 43% of households in urban India reported zero consumption of eggs, meat, or fish in the 30 days before the survey. Panel B in table 10 presents DID estimates of impact of pulse subsidy on protein intake for vegetarian households from pulses and other sources. As expected, a pulse subsidy results in a larger increase in consumption of pulse proteins of 2.29 gm/day/household by vegetarian households. The impact on total protein intake of vegetarian households is, however, smaller (10.2 gm/day) and statistically not significant.
Apart from estimating the effect of a subsidy on the sub-sample of vegetarian households, we also estimated a triple difference or differencein-difference-in-difference (DDD) model, laid out in equation (4), where we compared the protein intake (from pulses and all food sources) of vegetarian and non-vegetarian households, in treatment and control states, in 2004/05 (pre-treatment) and 2009/0 (posttreatment):
Here, b 1 , the coefficient of the triple interaction term, is the main coefficient of interest in the DDD model. Results are presented in the first row of panel C in table 9; b 1 is statistically not significant, either for quantity of pulse protein consumed or total consumption of protein from all sources.
Households at Different Levels of Pulse Consumption: Quantile Regression
Until now, we tried to estimate the average effect of pulse subsidy on pulse (protein) consumption of households entitled to the subsidy. This provides only a partial view of the relationship; next we try to describe the relationship at different points in the conditional distribution of pulse consumption and protein intake. We use quantile regression to characterize the relationship of pulse subsidy with the Note: Dependent variable in the first column of results ¼ total daily intake of protein from all food sources (gm/household/day). Dependent variable in the second column of results ¼ total daily intake of protein from pulses (gm/household/day). Protein conversion factors are taken from the "Dietary Guidelines for Indians" prepared by the National Institute of Nutrition (NIN 2011). Panel A: Households reporting no egg, meat, or fish consumption in 30 days prior to the survey are classified as (de facto) vegetarian households. Panel B: Households owning two or fewer of the following 10 assets are classified as poor households: sewing machine, electric fan, bicycle, motorbike, car, radio, television, fridge, air conditioner, and own land. Panel C estimates a triple difference model, shown in equation (4), where we compare household monthly pulse consumption of vegetarian and non-vegetarian households in treatment states and the rest of India before and after the introduction of pulse subsidy. All models in the table also include the usual set of household controls: location of the household (rural or urban), the main occupation of the family, the family size and sex, age, religion, caste group, education level of household head, whether the household purchased rice, wheat, or sugar from the PDS, household source of cooking and lighting fuel, land quintiles, and whether anyone in the household took a meal outside home. Standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses. Superscript þ ¼ p < 0.10, while asterisks indicate the following: * ¼ p < 0.05, ** ¼ p < 0.01, and *** ¼ p < 0.001.
entire distribution of pulse consumption and protein intake, not merely its conditional mean. The prior in this analysis is that effects of treatment at lower or higher quantiles may be different (Koenker and Hallock 2001) . Models used to construct these estimates include a treatment and a time dummy and the full set of household controls used in the standard DID models estimated earlier in the paper. Panel A in table 11 reports the QDID coefficients of a regression based on quantiles of monthly household intake of pulse protein. According to this model, pulse subsidy led to a bigger increase in pulse consumption of households with higher levels of pulse consumption. The effect size is 0.049 kg, 0.101 kg and 0.237 kg at 0.25 quantile, 0.5 quantile (the conditional median), and 0.75 quantile, respectively.
The subsidy-induced increase in the money spent on pulses was very similar across the entire distribution of household pulse expenditure. The increase ranged from Rs. 11.82/ month for 0.25 quantile to Rs. 15.43 for 0.75 quantile of household pulse expenditure (Panel B of table 11).
Figure 2 plots one covariate, that is, pulse subsidy effects' variation across quantiles. QDID coefficients of quantile regressions (without household controls) of the impact of pulse subsidy across different levels of (a) household pulse consumption (panel A) and (b) household expenditure on pulses (panel B). Panel A shows that except for the highest quantiles, pulse subsidy led to a similar increase in pulse consumption across the distribution. This is evident from the fact that the confidence interval of the QDID coefficient overlaps with the confidence intervals of the mean effects, except for the highest quintile.
Households that consume more pulses are not necessarily richer. The average monthly per capita consumption expenditure (MPCE) of households at 0.25, 0.5 and 0.75 quantiles of pulse consumption are Rs. 1,543, Rs. 1,249 and Rs. 1,809, respectively. Therefore, we also estimated the two QDID models separately for poor and non-poor households with the poor identified as before. Supplementary online appendix table A3 shows QDID coefficients of the 4 quantile regressions. A subsidy had only a small effect on both poor and non-poor households in the lower quantiles. At a higher (0.75) quantile, the coefficient is somewhat larger for the poor households (0.300 kg vs. 0.259 kg) as seen in panel A of supplementary online appendix table A3. The impact of pulse subsidy on total household expenditure of pulses (panel B in supplementary online appendix table A3) is statistically significant only for non-poor households. Poor households might switch their market purchases to cheaper pulse upon receiving subsidized pulse from the PDS.
Scaling Results by Actual PDS Users
Not all households access the PDS to buy subsidized food grains. In 2009/10, 72% of households in AP, 88% of households in HP, 18% of households in Punjab, and 89% of households in TN bought rice, wheat, or sugar from FPS (figure 3).
As NSSO CES does not report data on pulse purchases from market and PDS separately, we cannot tell if a household really bought subsidized pulses from the PDS. We assume that only households that bought at least one food item (rice, wheat, or sugar) from PDS would have bought subsidized pulses. We also assume that a household in the treatment states that bought any food item from PDS would have bought pulses from there too.
We use these two assumptions to rescale the coefficient estimates obtained earlier in panel B of table 5 to get closer to a "treatment on treated" estimate of the impact of pulse subsidy. After rescaling, we receive an estimated increase in household pulse consumption of 369 gm/month in AP, 393 gm/month in HP, and 363 gm/month in TN (table 12) . It is possible that even households that did not buy rice, wheat, or sugar from FPS did buy pulses because of the higher per unit subsidy on pulse. If so, our rescaling would overestimate the impact of a subsidy on household pulse consumption. The overestimation would be particularly high for Punjab, where only 18% of households bought rice, wheat, or sugar from FPS. On the other hand, if some households did buy rice, wheat, or sugar, but did not buy pulses from the PDS because they did not have enough cash or some other reason, then our rescaling would underestimate the actual impact of pulse subsidy on the compliers.
Spillover Effects of Pulse Subsidy
Pulse subsidies can have two opposite effects on consumption of other protein-rich food items. The substitution effect will tend to reduce their consumption while the income effect can increase the quantities consumed. We try to measure the spillover effects of a pulse subsidy on consumption of other food items by estimating a DID model as above for each of the following food items: beef, chicken, eggs, milk, and mutton. Panel A in table 13 shows our coefficients of interest. Pulse subsidy seems to have a large positive effect on the consumption of fish, relatively small effects on the consumption of eggs, beef, chicken, and mutton and a large negative effect on milk consumption. However, none of the coefficients are statistically significant if we make Bonferroni corrections in the threshold p-value to account for multiple hypothesis testing. Even without the Bonferroni corrections, only the coefficient on fish consumption is statistically significant at 5%.
We also test if a pulse subsidy had a positive effect on non-food expenditures. Again, after Bonferroni corrections, we do not find a significant effect of the subsidy on expenditures on fuel, clothing, education, health, or entertainment.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
India's PDS mainly provides subsidized rice and wheat. Some researchers contend that subsidizing only rice and wheat through PDS lowers diet diversity, and they recommend diversifying the basket of food grains provided by the PDS (Jha et al. 2013; Desai and Vanneman 2014) . Around 2007/08, four states started providing small quantities (1-3 kg/household/month) of pulses at low prices through the PDS. More recently, India's NFSA added the provision of coarse cereals at INR1/kg. Some states like Karnataka and Odisha have already started selling coarse cereals at FPS, and others, for example, Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu, now also subsidize edible oil through the PDS. While diversifying the PDS basket is gaining popularity among academics, activists, and politicians, its impact on household diets has not been rigorously assessed. We use representative large data from different rounds of NSSO CES, conducted before and after the introduction of subsidized pulses into PDS in four states of India, and apply a DID method to estimate the impact Source: Authors' estimates using data from 61st and 66th rounds of the NSSO CES data. of a pulse subsidy on the consumption of pulses and protein intake. We find that a monthly provision of 1 kg of subsidized pulse increases household pulse consumption by around 250gms/month, and total protein intake by 359gms/month. The program has a larger effect on pulse consumption of vegetarian households (those not consuming meat, fish, or eggs), households that own more assets, and households with higher levels of pulse consumption. The VDSA panel data from Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra, with detailed information on source-wise purchases of pulses, shows that cheap PDS pulses mainly replace market purchases, resulting in only a small increase in total pulse consumption. Pulse subsidy, therefore, works mainly as an income transfer program and not so much as a nutritional intervention.
Our findings are in line with what economists have known at least since Southworth (1945) : an in-kind subsidy on a specified food item will increase its consumption appreciably only after the recipient's preferred level of consumption is covered. Inframarginal transfers of subsidized food items work essentially like cash grants. Our assessment of the impact of the provision of subsidized pulses in the PDS of in four states of India supports this theoretical prediction.
We would like to point out two potential limitations of our results. First, we cannot see if a household bought subsidized pulses from the PDS or not in the NSSO data. Therefore, our estimates intend to treat estimates of the impact of the program. The average impact on compliers may be somewhat larger. Second, we do not have high frequency panel data on source-wise pulse purchase at the national level. There is a gap of 5 years between pre-(2004/05) and post-(2009/10) data we use in our main DID model. Given the time gap, omitted timevarying effects are a potential concern. We try to address this concern by using data from a thin round of NSSO CES as the pretreatment data, and receive similar results. The high frequency VDSA panel data on the source-wise purchase of pulses addresses both the issues raised here and returns similar estimates of the impact of the pulse subsidy program in AP.
Multiple hypothesis testing could be an issue of concern in interpreting all the results in this paper. While our analysis follows a Note: Coefficient estimates presented here are from a series of DID models (as in equation 1), one for each of the six food items and the total food expenditure, excluding pulses (panel A) and the six non-food items and the total non-food expenditure (panel B). Time and treatment dummies and household controls are included in both models, but coefficients are not shown here for brevity. Household controls include location of the household (rural or urban), the main occupation of the family, the family size and sex, age, religion, caste group, education level of household head, whether the household purchased rice, wheat, or sugar from the PDS, household source of cooking and lighting fuel and land quintiles, and whether any member of the household took meals outside home. plan that is theoretically motivated, it is important to point out that in conducting analyses with sub-samples and other robustness checks, the paper ends up estimating nearly 50 different DID models. Bonferroni corrections can be useful to counteract the problem of multiple comparisons. Readers may refer to only those coefficients with p-values less than 0.001 for a more conservative interpretation of our results. Coefficients with p-values less than 0.001 have been clearly marked in all regression results. Our findings have important implications for the ongoing policy debate and initiatives to expand the PDS portfolio to increase diet diversity and reduce malnutrition in India. After NFSA, India has committed huge resources to add coarse cereals (at INR1/kg) to the PDS basket. Some states have already started implementing this provision of NFSA and other states may follow them.
Both economic theory and empirical analyses suggest that including nutrient-rich foods in the PDS might not be an effective way to increase their consumption. Subsidizing inframarginal quantities of a food item with priceinelastic demand will lead to only a small increase in its total consumption, as we find in the case of pulses. A major part of the subsidy will get used to buy other food and nonfood items as Kaul (2014) and Kishore and Chakrabarti (2015) also find in their studies on the impact of an increase in PDS subsidy on cereals.
Is the small subsidy-induced increase in pulse consumption nutritionally meaningful? Our estimates show that the provision of 1 kg of subsidized pulses leads to an increase in average pulse consumption by 126-266 gm/ household/month or 0.84-1.77 gm/person/ day. Average pulse consumption in India is 28-31 gm/person/day, whereas the recommended daily consumption is 40 gm/person/ day. A pulse subsidy will therefore help reduce the gap between the actual and the recommended consumption levels by 7% to 20%. If we look at the impact on protein consumption, pulse subsidy resulted in an increase in intake of pulse proteins by 1.4 gm/ household/day (2.29 gm/day for vegetarian households), and total protein intake by approximately 12 gm/household/day (21 gm/day for poor households), which is 6% of the National Institute of Nutrition's (NIN) recommended daily protein intake of 200 gm/ household. Note that Indians derive 60% of their protein intake from cereals with relatively low digestibility and quality. Complementing cereal intake with high-quality protein sources like pulses is essential to meet the indispensable amino acids (IAA) requirement. Nutritionally, an increase in quality protein intake is more important than an increase in total protein intake (Swaminathan, Vaz, and Krupad 2012) .
If the government provides 1 kg of subsidized pulses, with a subsidy of INR20-30/kg to all NFSA beneficiaries, it would lead to a 3% to 6% increase in the intake of pulse protein from its current levels, help bridge 7% to 20% of the gap between actual and recommended pulse protein intake, and will help meet about 6% of the recommended daily allowance of protein for an annual transfer of INR 43-61 billion (USD 0.62-0.94 billion).
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The program will cost much more to the taxpayers because of the inefficiencies in the PDS. More importantly, unlike rice and wheat, India does not have surplus production or large buffer stocks of pulses to scale up and operate the program at the national level. Increasing pulse production may be the only sustainable way (trade offers a limited scope) to ensure affordable access to pulse to all households (Joshi, Kishore, and Roy 2016) .
Our results showing little to modest nutritional effects from the consumption subsidy have been established in studies other than Jensen and Miller (2011) for different nutrients in India Kochar 2005; Tarozzi 2005 ). These studies look at commodities that were offered uniformly across the whole country. In contrast, the introduction of pulses offered a variation, as only some Indian states participated. It is not clear from the analysis what the effects would be if larger quantities of pulses were subsidized or better targeting schemes were employed across income groups. The scope remains to use experimental data to examine these issues for policy recommendations related to program design in terms of the size of the subsidy and its targeting.
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